[gerard.casey]

Dear David,

Your questions are perfectly in order. If position A and position B are logically contradictory, they cannot both be true. (They may, of course, both be false!)

However, if you don’t mind, I’m going to take a little pause before attempting to answer them because any kind of even semi-adequate answer will take me some time to put together and I’m working flat out at the moment to finish the first part of the lecture series on political philosophy that I promised Dr Woods. With a bit of luck, I should be able to get back to you towards the end of next week.

Best wishes,

Gerard Casey

[gerard.casey]

I believe Mises is making a general point about the logic of action.

We are moved to act because we are (relatively) dissatisfied with our present position and believe that by undertaking action A we can reach a more satisfactory position. The nature of the human condition is such that no matter what we have or what we can do, there is always more and better.

So, osgood401, while it’s true that, as you point out, ‘The living are subject to change and therefore [are] not absolute or complete], Mises isn’t only talking about death; what he is also rejecting is the idea that there is any perfect or complete state because in such a state there could, by definition, be nothing more perfect and so no reason to act.

Attempts to consider what life would be like in the presence of God alsmost always comes down to metaphors – the Beatific Vision, etc. Scripture openly admits that what a perfect state would be like is not something that we can currently conceive – ‘Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man what things God has prepared for those who love him.’

GC

[gerard.casey]

The question of the a priori, and whether or not here can be such things as synthetic a priori, is one of the most vexed in philosophy. The topic and the terminology was introduced into philosophy by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason and it has been controversial ever since.

One of the things that attracted me when reading Human Action was precisely the application of the notion of the a priori to the realm of human action. Normally, examples are taken from the refined area of mathematics.

Very crudely, for something to be a priori means that we can come to know it in advance of or apart from experience. For it to be synthetic is for it to convey information that is not merely definitional. Let’s see how this might work.

Take the proposition “All un-coerced exchanges are positive-sum”. Now, of course, you need experience to know what the terms in this proposition mean, not least the ability to use and understand language which is experientially-based. The a priori bit comes from the fact that once you grasp what ‘un-coerced exchange’ means and what ‘zero sum’ means, you realise that this proposition not only is true but that it has to be true. No empirical evidence is pertinent to establishing this claim. There’s no point in setting up an expedition to some remote unexplored area of the world to see what its inhabitants do vis-a-vis exchange. You already know that however they conceive of value (which may be culturally very different from how you conceive of it) they will nonetheless make un-coerced exchanges only if each of the parties to the exchange subjectively judges that he will benefit from them.

The synthetic bit comes from the fact that the two core concepts in this proposition – ‘un-coerced exchange’ and ‘zero sum’ are not just two ways of referring to the same phenomenon, as would be the case with ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ in the proposition ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’. So the proposition conveys genuine information. it is thus both synthetic and a priori.

It’s been a while since I thought about this topic so I hope I’ve haven’t made any appalling blunders in my account.

Best wishes,

Gerard Casey

[gerard.casey]

David: Your critique of Capps’s argument (on the succinct formulation of it you present) is, I think, correct. The conclusion validly derivable from premises 1. and 2. would be something like “the conjugal act is the more permissible kind of sexual act” which is not the conclusion Capps would like to reach. (To be absolutely certain, we should translate the argument into proper logical form but, for the moment, we can consider it more informally.)

But even if the argument as stated were valid, its soundness would be a matter of dispute for, as you correctly note, premise 1 is highly problematic. Most moral theories distinguish between our moral duties and acts of supererogation. So, for example, we might reasonably be taken to have a moral (not legal) duty to render assistance to people in dire need where our efforts involve little or no risk or expense to us, let’s say by throwing a lifebuoy to someone in danger of drowning. But it would be a different matter to say we have a moral duty to dive into a torrent to effect such a rescue. It might be admirable and commendable so to do but failure to do so could hardly be regarded as a failure to carry out one’s moral duty.

Best wishes,

GC

[gerard.casey]

David: Let’s take it that your argument is valid as it stands. That being so, if the premises are true, the conclusion would have to be true also. The critical premise, as you note, is premise 3. This, in one form or another, is at the heart of what has come to be called the Perverted Faculty Argument (henceforth PFA).

It’s clear that Natural Law (NL) theorists are committed to a teleological account of ethics. Put very simply, human beings are certain kinds of beings (not just formless masses of cellular material) and we can give a broad account of those activities that genuinely contribute to human flourishing and those that don’t. So, a life lived without friends is, in general, not one that could be said to be flourishing. So too a life with a near complete absence of physiological necessities – foods, drink. However, even if all this is so, there is no single prescription for the good human life.

Now all NL theorists invest human nature with a normative dimension. Earlier NL theorists tend to make use of the PFA in some form or another. However the difficulties with this arguments are well known. If it applies to sexual functions, does it apply to all other functions? If not, why not? What’s so special about sexuality? A hammer may have as its function the driving of nails but there doesn’t seem to be anything essentially problematic about using it to prepare steak for frying. And so on, and so on. The scholarly journals and the web are replete with discussions and examples.

The New NL theorists have attempted to give an account of NL theory that is not open to the usual objections but, as much criticism of their position has indicated, it’s often not clear to what extent they retain a conception of human nature as normative. If you liberate ethics completely from the teleology of our embodied condition, it seems as if there is nothing to prevent us from characterising our acts in any way that we choose. (I’m not saying, by that way, that this criticism is correct or that the New NL theorists don’t have a response….)

Despite all this, many people, myself included, retain a core intuition that as we are essentially embodied creatures, the teleology of our physical natures cannot but be relevant to the fulfilment of our ends and hence ethically relevant.

In my earlier academic life, I published an analysis of St Thomas’s account of the morality of action in the context of lying which pointed to some difficulties in that account. You can find this at: http://www.ucd.ie/philosophy/staff/gerardcasey/casey/unityinStT.pdf
Some years later, I published another piece, again analysing ethics from a broadly teleological perspective. You can find this at: http://www.ucd.ie/philosophy/staff/gerardcasey/casey/EthHumNat.pdf

So, where does that leave us or, more specifically, me? The PFA, while it gives expression to the basic intuition that our embodied condition and its intrinsic teleology is ethically significant, does so in a way that leaves it open to strong, perhaps insuperable, objections. The New NL theory isn’t open to these particular objections but has its own problems. If all this is so, can any reasonable case be made for the preservation of traditional sexual ethics that escapes the PFA objections and what tradition NL theories see as the limitations of the new NL theory? [I should say here that I have the utmost respect for those, such as Edward Feser and Janet Smyth, who have attempted to give reasoned accounts that are, broadly speaking, within the traditional NL camp.]

Short answer – I don’t know, but it’s worth trying. Here you can find someone attempting to do just this. https://anscombe.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/A%20Conjugal%20Theory%20of%20Sexual%20Morality%20%5BFinal%5D.pdf
I don’t necessarily endorse this particular argument but I simply offer it to you as an example of where the discussion has moved to.

I realise that you may well find all that I have said most unsatisfactory. I don’t find it particularly satisfactory myself and would like to be able to offer you a knock-down drag-out argument that settled everything conclusively. However, it should be remembered that the conclusion of an invalid or unsound argument isn’t necessarily false – it just hasn’t been proved by that argument. Moreover, we believe many things to be so without our being able to provide any argument for them at all.

This discussion takes us well outside the scope of logic which is primarily concerned with the establishment of validity/invalidity. But it also illustrates clearly the value of logic in enabling us to focus our critical attention on those parts of an argument that are essential to its soundness.

Best wishes,

GC

[gerard.casey]

Found it!

From what I can see of it, the Categorical Converter is a complicated diagrammatic representation of various combinations of eduction and the square of opposition. I haven’t checked out all the details but, if it follows the standard rules, then the relationship between the propositions will be correctly delineated.

Logic is a little like the manual that comes with your computer. You need to know about 5% to deal with 95% of what’s necessary. The rest you can look up as necessary.

I like to keep things as simple as possible so that the account I give in the course is intentionally simplified (not falsified!) to avoid unnecessary detail and complication. For example, I state that conversion is invalid on A and O type propositions (excepting definitions). Standard accounts tell us that there is an operation called ‘Conversion by limitation’ which takes us from SAP to PIS (the limitation takes us from universal to particular and the conversion is as per normal). But there’s no need to have a special operation here. We can get from SAP to SIP by alternation on the square of opposition, and from SIP to PIS by (simple) conversion. It may take one step longer but we can also dispense with one extra rule.

Given my propensity to forget to check the Forum regularly, if you do start a new thread, drop me an email at gerard.casey@ucd.ie to let me know. That way, I can respond quickly.

I hope I’ve answered your question?

Best wishes,

GC

[gerard.casey]

Just noticed your post! Sorry about the delay. I’ve been so taken up with preparing my new course on the history of political thought that I forgot to check the forum.

I’ve never heard of the Categorical Converter but I’ll check it out and get back to you ASAP.

[gerard.casey]

David: You raise some very interesting questions on a topic I haven’t thought about for quite some time. If you don’t mind, I’ll take a little time to think about them and then get back to you.

Before I do, remember there are two ways to criticise an argument: 1. dispute its validity (claim that even if its premises were true, the conclusion wouldn’t follow); and 2. dispute its soundness (grant its validity – at least for the sake of the argument – but dispute the truth of one or more of its premises). You’ve asked about the shape of the argument (validity) and disputed its soundness by questioning premise 3.

Thanks for letting me know that you opened up a new thread.

[gerard.casey]

Mises007: I’ll try sending those files to you again. Hope they come through this time!

GC

[gerard.casey]

Welcome aboard, Matt. I hope you find the material in LC interesting. If you have any problems with the Logic, use the Forum or email me directly at gerard.casey@ucd.ie. If you start a new thread on the Logic Forum, it’s useful to send a copy to me directly so that I know you’ve made a contribution and I can respond quickly.

Good learning!

GC

[gerard.casey]

TurnUpTheAC:

osgood401 is, I believe, essentially correct. Your interlocutor seems to be arguing that the flavour of bacon comes exclusively from fat so that we should just leave the bacon to one side and concentrate on the fat. Hmmmm?

What exactly is the argument here? More to the point, how does it relate to what you wrote?

GC

[gerard.casey]

Matt_Georgia: Your correspondent has a point. Many terms in philosophy generally (justice, knowledge, existence), and in political philosophy in particular, are essentially contested.

As should have been obvious from my discussion with Dr Woods, I never denied that Ireland had many little kingdoms. What I was trying to get across was that such kingdoms bear very little resemblance to what we know as the state today. Law in those little kingdoms was essentially independent of political control.

Of course, the Roman Republic was a state in some sense of the term, as was the Roman Empire. But, once again, for the most part, Roman law was not a function of political power.

GC

[gerard.casey]

osgood401: In your response to JohnD’s post, you write:

“1 Ben works at the mall everyday.
2Ben never misses work.
3 Ben is likely to go to the mall tomorrow.
if 1 and 2 are true then 3 is true. Ben could get sick and miss work tomorrow but because 3 is not definitive it is still true.”

This isn’t a problem with future contingents but is, rather, a matter of probability which raises a whole other set of problems. As you phrase it, a lot hinges on premise 2. ‘Ben never misses work’. Is this to be understood historically (i.e. as a matter of fact, Ben has never missed work to date) or predictively or normatively (Ben will never miss work). If it’s taken historically, then it seems to me that the argument would be valid even if Ben were to become ill and stay at home. However, if you take it predictively or normatively, then it’s hard to see how Ben’s stay-at-homeness hasn’t falsified the premise.

As should be apparent from this response and my previous response to JohnD, issues of probability, future contingency and the like are some of the more vexed problems in the philosophy of logic. See Susan Haack’s book called Philosophy of Logics for more on such topics.

GC

[gerard.casey]

John D: what you’re asking about are so-called future contingents. This is a perennial and unresolved problem in logic/epistemology ever since Aristotle talked about the sea battle that was going to take place tomorrow.

There appear to be two basic options here: 1. these propositions have a determinate truth value but it’s not known to us at the moment but is known to somebody with greater epistemological powers, e.g. God; or, 2. these propositions have no determinate truth value and so are known to no one, including God.

The argument has been going on for 2,500 years and the jury’s still out!

GC

[gerard.casey]

Dear Dr Fleischer,

That’s a lot of material! You’re lucky to have someone willing and able to converse with you so extensively.

Let me see if I can address some issues.

Your interlocutor writes:
“Consider the following scenario: if we were to eliminate gov’t, in fact, let’s eliminate all gov’ts everywhere at every level (the true anarchist wet dream), then we would be left with many businesses going about their business of making money. Business is a cut-throat world. Profits are all important. Without any external institutions to keep businesses in line (no coercive institutions with no gov’ts), then businesses will do what they want and need to in order to protect their business. In that environment, do you seriously believe that business will NOT revert to using coercive tactics to ensure their profitability? Corporate wars will be the most likely outcome…and we’ll do it to ourselves all over again, just under different “ideological” banners. Maybe we’ll be lucky and end up with the world of first “Rollerball” film…with Jonathan E (James Caan) for president! I’d vote for him.”

This objection seems to me to be independent of the overall issue of privacy. It amounts to the well-worn Hobbesian point that without an ‘external’ coercive government, predation will be the natural outcome of social interaction and so we need a coercive government. It’s possible to have an argument on this point (ini fact, that’s what libertarians spend a lot of their time doing!) but the argument on privacy can only be fruitfully discussed once we decide which paradigm [libertarian/non-libertarian] we’re operating with. Trying to do everything at once is likely to lead to confusing and to correspondents talking past each other.

So, to privacy.

From a libertarian perspective, does one have a right to privacy? Like many other issue, it depends on what one takes privacy to be. Does it amount to having a right to have others not know things about you? If this is so, it’s hard to see how this can be justified on libertarian principles. Where’s the aggression in someone’s knowing that I work in a particular place or what my name is or the colour of my hair?

If someone looks in through my window from the public road and sees me watching television when I should be at work, this is unpleasant but the answer is simple: draw your curtains or lower your blinds. If someone puts a listening device or a camera on my property without my consent, then they’ve violated my property rights and from a libertarian I should have redress against.

If I have a contactual relationship with a person or institution and a constitutive element of that relationship is that information obtained during that relationship is not to be revealed to anyone else, then, if it is, we have a breach of contract.

Much of what has been revealed in the Snowden disclosures (if true) would appear to be, from a libertarian perspective, property violations and so, from a libertarian perspective, illegal.

Come back to me if your discussion turns up any more interesting points.

GC

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