[derosa8]

Dr. Casey, sorry for the confusion. I got lost a little in reading my last posting. I agree that the new way I formulated muddles the waters and may beg the question. So, I will stick with your formulation (the “d” version). There is one thing I’d like to try to comment on again to make sure the problem with Rand’s position is clear.

You said this which is right on point, “Whether or which, the key to the discussion (it seems to me, unless I’m completely missing the point, which is certainly possible) is the distinction between the initiation of force against another, which violates the rights of the other, and the response to such force by the person who is aggressed against which is not only not a violation of the right of the attacker but must be available to the person aggressed against, otherwise you would have rights that were, in principle, incapable of defence. This, I think, might address the issue you raise under your ’3rd Part’: the attacker who is physically resisted doesn’t have his inalienable rights infringed.”

Granted, this may explain actions that are made in defense of one’s rights. However, I think Rand (and Locke’s) positions do not provide a foundation for just punishments. For example, someone murders another person and is then arrested, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison. Upon what basis can we justify this alienation of the murderer’s rights? Quite obviously, we cannot justify such punishment if we take inherent, inalienable rights as our ground.

Again, it appears the only escape for Rand (and Locke?) is to say that the murderer has lost or forfeited his human nature.

[derosa8]

Dr. Casey, your analysis has been extremely helpful, very thoughtful, and painlessly instructive. I admit I have not yet worked through more than 4 lectures of the course, but as a beginner student in logic, I have greatly enjoyed them. I studied mathematics in college, and so I employed logic, but never with much of anything other than mathematical arguments. Here are some of my thoughts in response:

1st Part:
Let me start by saying that I agree with your reformulation of the argument. I would make some (minor?) changes to A and B. If you could let me know if this new argument makes sense that would be awesome.

Let A = Rand rejects initiatory force because it violates man’s inalienable rights.
Let B = Rand permits retaliatory force against man’s inalienable rights.
Let H = Human beings have inalienable rights.

The form of the argument would then be the same:

(1e) If A, then H.
(2e) If B, then not H.
(3e) Both A and B.
Therefore, (4e) both H and not H, a contradiction.

So, if the premises are true, then Rand’s thoughts are shown to be inconsistent here.

2nd Part:
Would this not also be an indictment of Jefferson’s or John Locke’s thought? Simply replace “Rand” with “Jefferson” or “Locke” and the same argument initially seems plausible.

However, as Jerryb225 and I discussed above, Locke attempts to reconcile the contradiction by changing (2e). In Locke’s thought, 2e would transform into something like:

(2e*) If Locke permits retaliatory force against persons that are not human in nature, then human beings do not have inalienable rights.

However, this is plainly false as the consequent is not necessarily true when the antecedent is true. But as I discussed with Jerryb225, I believe Locke’s analysis requires an untenable definition of “a nature.” It seems like a case of special pleading where he has defined “human nature” in such a way to avoid contradicting inalienable rights. Moreover, it appears to be quite a dangerous move regarding ethics, since there is no distinction remaining to prevent all initial aggressors from being treated as mere animals.

Jerryb225 said: “Now that you mention it I do remember her saying the thing about man ceasing to be a man when he violates rights. I might take that to mean that when a man chooses to violate rights he is implicitly saying that rights are not valid thus implicitly negating his own rights which would open him up to being attacked validly by the one being violated.”

This also seems to be odd analysis. If your interpretation is accurate, then would anyone who implicitly or explicitly denies the doctrine of inalienable rights forfeit his own rights? Or are you saying it is the case that such a man would not cirectly forfeit his own right, but rather forfeit his own nature?

I find that untenable and inconsistent with a free society. Moreover, it gets even more odd when you consider the explicit/implicit paradigm. For example, in a free society, we would not be permitted to retaliate with force against someone who explicitly voiced an opinion against the inalienable rights of man (if we could, then then speech is not truly free). However, according to your interpretation above, implicit statements against inalienable rights are grounds for retaliatory force [i.e. punishment]. But upon what basis do we permit retaliatory force if the statement is implicit, yet exclude it if the statement is explicit? I know this is not your personal view, but I just wanted to comment anyway because I found the analysis you offered to be an interesting attempt at reconciling her thought. But I don’t find it do be tenable because it forces you to say: implicit statements against inalienable rights forfeit one’s human nature but explicit statements do not.

Simply ask the question, who is more human?
– The truly repentant sinner who at one time physically assaulted and beat up a homeless person.
– The extreme Marxist who has always desired to treat populations as herds of animals, yet personally engages in no physical wrongdoing.

I think the “more human” or “human or not” questions just become subjective and perplexing real fast. I think it is more consistent to conclude that all members of our species are human regardless of whether they initiate “inhumane” actions.

3rd Part:

Dr. Casey wrote, “A Randian might claim that 2d should read: If B then H (rather than if B then not H) and if pressed for his reason for asserting this, might respond that retaliatory force and initiatory force while both involving physical violence and so being indistinguishable from a physical perspective, nonetheless are morally distinct.”

While this may true, I’d continue to argue that it does nothing to save the Randian from contradiction. Even if I grant that retaliatory force and initiatory force are morally distinct, that does not solve the question of inalienable rights. If rights are truly inalienable, then they cannot be alienated and force that permits their alienation should be rejected. One potential solution is the Lockean one that I discussed above, but merely asserting a moral distinction (that I agree with) does not solve the problem.

[derosa8]

Jerryb225: Your examples seems to take the form of “See, wouldn’t this be absurd? Therefore, it cannot be right.” I totally agree with you on that. However, the critic I was listening to pointed out that Rand’s foundation is inconsistent with defensive force, retaliatory force, or any other kind of force.

If it is true that rights are “natural” or “innate” and thus they are “inalienable” then I don’t understand her basis for permitting violations of rights, even when they are in self-defense. After probing a tiny bit further. It seems that the only answer She (and John Locke) gave for this is that when a person initiates aggression against another human, then they cease to be human themselves. Therefore, non-humans no longer possess the natural rights of humans.

That explanation is consistent with their views, but seems totally bizarre. Do we really lose our nature if we become an aggressor? Such a view would seem to imply an odd definition of what “a nature” even is.

Perhaps Dr. Casey will save the day with some clarifications. I have not taken this to an objectivist forum. I don’t know much about objectivism (is that what we’re talking about?) other than it’s the name of Rand’s philosophy.

[derosa8]

Dr. Casey, I will await your response, but of course you may respond at your leisure; that sounds like quite the crazy day.

Jerryb225: Thanks for your input. However, the critic is not arguing that it’s unethical to permit retaliatory force. Rather, he was saying that Rand’s foundation of Man’s Rights (that they are inherent in his nature) provides no logical basis for permitting retaliatory force. Here is Rand’s Essay, Man’s Rights: http://www.globalgovernancewatch.org/docLib/20120822_Ayn_Rand-_Man_s_Rights_1_.pdf

The critic’s main point was that Rand’s foundation of for the non-aggression principle is inconsistent with our concept of justice. So, it appears all you have done with your example is reaffirmed the critic’s position. In other words, since retaliatory force is the only way to provide justice, then it ought to be permitted. The critic would agree with you, but he would say Rand gives us no logical basis for reaching that conclusion.

[derosa8]

Good point, thanks Dr. Casey. However, that doesn’t really clear up the whole argument. Let me represent it without the equivocation.

(1) Rand objects to the initiation of force because humans have inalienable rights.
(2) Rand permits retaliatory force against these inalienable rights.
(3) 1 and 2 are either inconsistent or incoherent. If the rights are inalienable, then upon what basis is retaliatory force that alienates them permitted? If the rights are not inalienable, then the statements are incoherent.

I did not intend for the equivocation to slip in the first time; it was due to my wording. The argument above is more along the lines of what the critic intended

[derosa8]

From what I can gather, these two states seem to make up his main thesis:

(1) “Markets may determine what cars sell for but cannot tell how much of that value each team member contributes.”

(2) “Since in the real world managers rarely have any sure idea how to use more capital and less labor, or vice versa, markets cannot determine how much workers earn.”

Here are some initial thoughts. His statement in (1) seems to presuppose some type of objective theory of value. He seems to be saying, “Wages ought to be based on the percentage employee X contributes to production.” What is the objectively right percentage? How do we objectively determine how much he contributed? He does not tell us. But apparently entrepreneurs are not good at this, so we need some type of social planning?

His statement in (2) is downright odd (or at least sounds that way to me). It implies that the reason markets do not determine wages is that managers have “no sure idea how to use more capital and less labor.” What? I honestly am confused. First, markets DO determine wages, so what does he mean by they can’t determine wages? I’m guessing he means that markets cannot determine FAIR wages. That gets right back into the objective theory of value he seems to be arguing from. Who decides what’s fair? Government? Experts? There is no better answer than the unhampered market.

Also, he possibly is assuming that prices are determined by the cost of production (though it may not be central to his argument). If so, professor Herbener explains why this view is false in the last 10 minutes of the 2nd lecture of prices of consumer goods.

[derosa8]

Haha. In regard to marriage and the state, it definitely seems that they are so annoyingly intertwined that it would be difficult to go back to how things were. Then again, it wasn’t all that long ago in which the state had nothing to do with the marriage business. I have not looked into it, but my guess is it was right around when the Federal income tax became a thing, which ironically, is right around the time we got the Federal Reserve. If that’s accurate, 100 years of bad economic social policy might allow us to change some minds regarding those issues and others.

Roe v. Wade is also flat out unconstitutional if you are a strict constructionist.

[derosa8]

I’m on board with that suggestion Porphyrogenitus

[derosa8]

Professor Herbener, you said, “Investment counts only if it’s for assets held by the entrepreneur and used by him in production. If an auto company builds a new factory or buys new equipment, it’s included. But the tires, paint, steel, and all other intermediate capital goods the company buys are not included.”

I’m still a bit confused. If buying new equipment is included, then wouldn’t the equipment used to erect a new factory be included in “new equipment”? It just seems that it would be awfully difficult for people calculating the statistic to determine whether equipment is directly related to the function of the business or whether it is an “intermediate capital good.”

[derosa8]

Rand Paul as well =)

[derosa8]

Sorengaard, I gotcha. But the original question was exactly that, whether or not it was based on just perception. I agree with you that it is not grounded merely in perception.

Haley11, you say, “What I realized ultimately is that there is no truth anymore.” Is that TRUE? Also, if you say there exists a moral high ground, then I think you are saying that morality is not merely grounded in perception.

[derosa8]

Haley11, you make some good points. But there are problems that arise with a Federal amendment. I can think of 3 examples off the top of my head that would be be ILLEGAL if there were to be a new marriage amendment.

1. An adoption agency gives special consideration to married couples, but does not acknowledge same sex couples as being married.

2. A private hospital gives special visitation rights to spouses of married couples but it does not acknowledge same sex couples as being married.

3. A state public school includes marriage education in its curriculum and chooses to teach that only heterosexual marriages are legitimate.

I would argue that 1, 2, and 3 should all be legal; institutions have a choice of what they want to recognize as marriage. By instituting a Federal law mandating same sex marriage acceptance across the states, we would open up the door to more govt intrusion in the peoples’ private decisions.

Also, if the constitution means anything, it would take a Federal Amendment (3/4 of states voting yes) to make same sex marriage the law of the land, since there is nothing in the Constitution that says the legislature can tell the states what they have to do about marriage.

As far as the immigration visas and such, you do bring up a great point. However, I think the problem is government getting involved and sanctioning marriages in the first place. Idk how immigration would work on a completely free market, but I think it might alleviate those problems better than govt decree.

[derosa8]

“None of the production of these intermediate capital goods is included in GDP.”

They aren’t counted as investment expenditures? As in, company X spends (invests?) 2 million dollars in new mining areas.

[derosa8]

Gotcha. But I don’t think you can affirm both (A) morality is only grounded in human perception and (B) morality is objective.

Aren’t they mutually exclusive?

Also, I realized that Hazlitt has a book called the Foundations of Morality which would probably shed light on these discussions. I have not read it yet, but it’s available on mises.org

[derosa8]

Sorengard, if you affirm 3, then you are saying our morality is more than merely subjective.

[Author]

Posts