[david_konietzko]

Thank you. I’m looking forward to your answer!

[david_konietzko]

We are moved to act because we are (relatively) dissatisfied with our present position and believe that by undertaking action A we can reach a more satisfactory position.

Wouldn’t it be more correct to say that we are moved to act because we believe that by undertaking action A we can reach a more satisfactory (future) position than the (future) position we would achieve without action A?

[david_konietzko]

Thank you! And a new course on the history of conservatism and libertarianism sounds like a great idea.

[david_konietzko]

Rothbard thought that moral laws (just like mathematical or chemical laws) could only be discovered, but not made or invented. In other words, the binding force of moral laws is not derived from any human authority. No one can make an action moral or immoral just by saying so, any more than I could make 2+2 equal 5 just by saying so.

Hence, there would be no permanent legislature in a libertarian society. Rothbard suggested that at the biginning of a libertarian society, a kind of constitutional convention might promulgate a libertarian law code (and then presumably dissolve itself). But the law code’s authority would not derive from its being promulgated by the convention, but from its content being in tune with the natural law. (Compare: When I publish a new mathematical theorem, whether or not it ought to be accepted by the mathematical community depends on the soundness of the proof, not on the fact that I published it.)

In an anarcho-capitalist society, competing private arbitration and protection agencies would interpret and enforce the law, but that doesn’t mean they would be the government. A government is defined as a monopolist of law-enforcement.

[david_konietzko]

Dr. Casey, thanks for your reply. I agree that morality has to be based on human flourishing and that what counts as human flourishing depends on human nature and, in particular, on the biological functions of our natural faculties (just not in the way the perverted-faculty argument assumes). And I also agree that we are sometimes justified in holding moral beliefs based on our moral intuitions, just as we are sometimes justified in holding aesthetic beliefs based on our sense of beauty. However, the more controversial a (moral or aesthetic) opinion is, the more it is in need of argumentative justification.

Thank you for pointing me to the article by Charles Capps. I like his arguments against classical and “new” natural-law theories and his proof that the sexual drive is naturally directed towards the conjugal act (i.e., a sexual act which occurs within a loving relationship and tends to result in children who are then lovingly raised by both parents). But his own defense of traditional sexual morality is unconvincing; if I am not mistaken, it goes roughly as follows:

1. Altruism (self-giving love) is the sum and essence of morality; i.e., we should always behave as altruistically as possible.
2. The conjugal act is more altruistic than other kinds of sexual acts.
3. Therefore, the conjugal act is the only permissible kind of sexual act.

Premise 2 is plausible (given Capps’s definition of “conjugal act”), but you don’t need to be an Objectivist to see that premise 1 is highly problematic (and inadequately defended by Capps). Self-sacrificing love is just one of many human goods; consequently, there can be an excess of it (such as when someone sacrifices his life to spare a stranger a small inconvenience).

But even if premise 1 were true, the argument would be invalid (and here we return to logic). The premises merely show that the conjugal act is to be preferred over other kinds of sexual acts when both options are available.

[david_konietzko]

No, not at all. Rothbard responds to this allegation here. Briefly, he argues as follows: If people are perfectly good, no government is necessary. If people are perfectly evil, government will be made up entirely of evil people and cannot improve the situation. If people are a mixture of good and bad elements (as Rothbard believed), then we need institutions which bring out the best in people and discourage their evil traits. Historically, governments have been the biggest outlets for evil (e.g., policemen have the opportunity to beat and taser innocent people with impunity). Rothbard thought private defense agencies in an anarcho-capitalist framework were the most efficient protection against criminals.

[david_konietzko]

Thank you very much! I am looking forward to your answer (and even more to your new course on the history of political thought).

[david_konietzko]

Thanks!

[david_konietzko]

Warin, for an introduction to conservatism in the Burkean tradition, I recommend Conservatism: Dream and Reality by conservative sociologist Robert Nisbet. His chapter “Religion and Morality” outlines the conservative position on religion. He thinks that conservatives stress the necessity of religious institutions for a stable society, but are typically suspicious of religious enthusiasm and are often lukewarm believers at best.

A careful study would undoubtedly reveal that a considerable number of staunch conservatives, disciples to a man of Edmund Burke, had a regard for religion ranging from the indifferent to the outrightly hostile. … Robert Ingersoll, staunch conservative Republican and pillar of bar and bourse, was a militant atheist. H. L. Mencken and Albert Jay Nock … were opponents of Christianity. So was Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, though the latter somewhat unenthusiastically in later years. But all of them would doubtless have agreed with Tocqueville that some bulwark of faith, even if in a body of morality that is falsely credited with divine inspiration, is necessary to human beings and a means of saving them from the worst of the consequences of being among the alienated. (Transaction edition, p. 83)

[david_konietzko]

In my understanding, the libertarian position is as follows: A landowner has power over those who are on his land only in that he can evict them or prohibit them from using his land in specific ways. However, his right of eviction is not unlimited. He can evict people only if there are other landowners who are willing to accept them or if there is unowned land.

If there is no unowned land and no landowner wants to accept you on his property, then you can stay on whichever plot of land you are currently living on, since its owner cannot evict you without violating another landowner’s property rights. However, he can prohibit you from using his land in specific ways or from using certain parts of his land. I think if this doesn’t allow you to survive, then it is morally permissible to break these rules to the extent necessary for your survival, provided you pay compensation afterwards as soon as possible. This doesn’t mean that life generally takes precedence over property, since it is (at least sometimes) permissible to kill a criminal (i.e., a violator of property rights) even if he doesn’t threaten your life. And I don’t see how property can take precedence over freedom. What is freedom but a state of affairs where property rights are not violated?

[david_konietzko]

Clearly, the best presidents were:

Kim Il Sung, President of North Korea (1972-1994)
Idi Amin, President of Uganda (1971-79)
Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania (1974-89)
Adolf Hitler, President of Germany (1934-45)
Jean-Bédel Bokassa, President of Central Africa (1966-76)
Francois Duvalier, President of Haiti (1957-71)
Francisco Macías Nguema, President of Equatorial Guinea (1968-79)

[david_konietzko]

Further this argument is to the effect that the Constitution should be altered outside of the legitimate amendment process – which is what constitutes arbitrariness and lawlessness, that is, factors unlikely to lead to justice – and we get what we have now, and it is an example of how that path does not lead to justice, but rather, destruction.
The same argument might be used against originalism: If some federal judges overturn long-standing precedents based on the original understanding of the Constitution, others might feel free to reject precedent in favor of their own pet theories of constitutional interpretation, which would result in chaos and unpredictability. Therefore, federal judges ought to follow the principle of stare decisis, which at least guarantees stability – or so a supporter of the status quo might argue.

I suppose it is a question whether an optimal constitution would empower a Supreme Court to serve as a body of Platonic Guardians […]
I don’t claim that an optimal constitution would do so. If the positive law does not allow a court to hear a specific case, then the court should not hear that case. But I don’t agree that courts should always follow the positive law, even if it obliges them to commit an act of aggression. This applies to all courts, not just the U.S. Supreme Court (and also to police officers etc.). In other words, I endorse jury nullification, judge nullification, police-officer nullification etc. against unjust but constitutional laws. And I maintain that as a rule, it is impermissible to commit an injustice in order to minimize the total amount of injustice in the world.

But I agree that people should not work for law enforcement in the first place.

[david_konietzko]

No, it’s not a utilitarian approach. A utilitarian approach would be the one you favor: apply libertarian principles to the facts at hand, law be damned.

“Utilitarian” is not a synonym for “unprincipled” or “arbitrary.” Utilitarianism is the view that one should do whatever maximizes utility. Applying libertarian principles regardless of the positive law is not a utilitarian approach (unless one claims that we ought to apply libertarian principles because doing so will maximize utility).

[S]aying that federal judges are free to apply their own ideas of the Good, theTrue, and the Beautiful means that we’re in a lawless society: one in which the judges can impose whatever policies they want to impose upon us, and we can’t do anything.
But nobody has proposed that judges ought to apply whatever principles they think are just. Matt_Georgia’s original proposal (which he seems to have retracted) was that judges ought to apply whatever principles are in fact just (i.e., libertarian principles). And libertarian law has been worked out in quite some detail. Of course, there are disagreements about how to apply libertarian principles to particular issues, but this is the case with every law code known to man, including the Constitution (not every conceivable constitutional issue was explicitly discussed at the ratifying conventions).

On the alleged arbitrariness of natural law: The argument that judges ought to follow the positive law since otherwise the legal system would be unpredictable and arbitrary relies on the assumption that the rule of law is objectively better than arbitrary government. Isn’t this a kind of natural-law argument?

I think Dr. Gutzman’s position on Chisholm is defensible because we do not have an absolute duty to prevent others from acting unjustly. But we do have an absolute duty not to commit any injustices ourselves, even if we have taken an oath to do so. This means, e.g., that a judge may never convict someone of drug possession, even if a law that is in accordance with the constitution obliges him to do so.

[david_konietzko]

I wonder why Russia isn’t considered part of Western Civilization. It is traditionally Christian, and the Orthodox Church has some connection to Greek (I read that at the seminar where Stalin studied to become an Orthodox priest, the students were required to read Plato). So Russian culture seems to be partially derived from both the Greeks and the Hebrews. Does Orthodox Christianity not count as part of Western Civilization? Is this because “Western” refers to the Western part of the Roman Empire?

[david_konietzko]

The inquisition is covered in “Lecture 38: Crusades – Domestic.”

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