dardnerI would have been more clear had I wrote “Ben has yet to miss work” and In this case wouldn’t have required much on my part to have done so. At some point how exacting does one have to be? I tend to think in its context it would be taken historically for the same reason the conclusion is likely and not absolute. It seems difficult to account for all possible interpretations, for instance “Ben has yet to miss work” I could say” I have never missed work even when I didn’t show up, what does that have to do with Ben being at the mall tomorrow” I know that is cheeky but at what point is the other party responsible for comprehension. That is not to say I think I can be hopelessly vague, I think of a book club where everyone has a different interpretation of what the author meant. In such a case, instead of coming to a consensus perhaps they should admit the author wasn’t very good.
Does probability about future events play any useful role in logic?
Thinking ahead:
1) so and so is running as the democrat in the 2016 election
2) so on and so forth is running as the republican in the 2016 election
3) Libertarian X is running in the 2016 election
4)Libertarian X will not win the 2016 election, So what.
Do not take this as a defeatist attitude but for 4 to be false the most unlikely circumstance would have to occur. When then, would the improbable be enough to invalidate certain claims about a future event?
You mention Haack, I have watched a lecture of hers on scientism a while ago. She pointed out flaws with Karl Popper then said he was on to something but did not expand on this notion, which is about where I am with his method. Do you have any thoughts on this?
In watching the intelligent design evolution debates the scientists trot out this god of the gaps fallacy with the underlying premiss that science will eventually fill those gaps. That would seem to me a future proposition and in light of sciences inability to prove itself, one of rather dubious probability beyond a seemingly endless array of assumptions.